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The Adaptive Nature  
of Impulsivity 
Jeffrey R. Stevens1 and David W. Stephens2 
An old joke circulates among animal behavior instructors. One can, the 
joke goes, divide the topics of animal behavior into four Fs: fighting, flee-
ing, feeding, and reproduction. This somewhat tired joke carries consider-
able truth. Animals behaving in nature surely must make decisions about 
conflicts, predator avoidance, feeding, and mating. Male crickets, for exam-
ple, are notoriously combative. Studies have shown, however, that they es-
calate fights in some situations and retreat to fight another day in others 
(Beaugrand, 1997; Parker, 1974; Parker & Rubenstein, 1981). Squirrels, like 
many small animals, respond to the presence or absence of protective cover; 
for example, they will carry large food items into the safety of the bushes 
to consume them but eat small items immediately (Lima, Valone, & Car-
aco, 1985). Female widow birds prefer males with long tails, and evolution-
ary theorists have argued that tail length correlates with male quality (An-
dersson, 1982, 1994). So a female confronted with a short-tailed male faces a 
dilemma: mate now or keep looking. Notice that in all of these choice situ-
ations, time complicates the animal’s problem: Risk injury by fighting now 
or retreat to fight later; stay exposed to possible predation or invest time 
in moving to a safer place; settle for the short-tailed male or keep looking. 
Each of these situations, and indeed virtually any naturally occurring choice 
situation one can imagine, is an intertemporal choice problem. We define 
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these as choice situations in which an animal’s alternatives vary in the time 
at which the animal realizes consequences and in the quality of those conse-
quences once the animal secures them. 
Although intertemporal choice applies to many domains (and all four 
Fs), we need to focus on a specific situation to make scientific headway, and 
for virtually all behavioral ecologists interested in intertemporal choice that 
focal situation is foraging. We can observe animal foraging choices easily 
(e.g., animals eat more often than they reproduce), and we can manipulate 
the time and magnitude of foraging options much more easily than we can 
manipulate mate quality or predation risk. Moreover, we have a large base 
of theoretical and empirical results that help us frame the intertemporal 
choice problem in the context of animal foraging behavior. Foraging is not 
only a convenient topic but also a fundamentally important one; actively 
seeking food is a basic part of animal existence that deserves our attention. 
In the first part of this chapter, we focus on adaptive aspects of intertempo-
ral choice in animal foraging behavior, and especially on the problem of im-
pulsivity, which we see as a central problem in intertemporal choice. In the 
second part of this chapter, we take a broader perspective, including do-
mains other than food and extending beyond impulsivity to a more encom-
passing view of intertemporal choice. Within this general view, we explore 
the adaptive nature of impulsivity. 
Foraging and Intertemporal Choice 
A pileated woodpecker (Dryocopus pileatus)—a crow-sized North Ameri-
can woodpecker—works its way through the trees along a suburban lake. It 
typically lands on a tree trunk and moves up the trunk, making distinctive 
hopping motions as it goes. The pileated woodpecker feeds on wood-bor-
ing insects, and it uses its beak to chisel its prey from their galleries below 
the bark. What sorts of choices must a foraging woodpecker make? It will 
surely make choices about where to search (along the lake shore or along a 
ridge), which behavioral ecologists call habitat choice decisions. It will also 
make choices about how to search (how fast to fly, where to land on a tree, 
which parts of the tree to focus on). It will make choices about what to eat; 
in lean periods, it will attack small prey that it might pass by in better times. 
Although the woodpecker must make many decisions as it forages, we 
focus for the moment on the woodpecker’s problem of deciding how thor-
oughly to exploit each tree before flying to the next one. Should it make a 
few quick probes and move on to the next tree, or should it exhaustively 
check every crevice and abnormality in the bark? The reader will imme-
diately recognize costs and benefits of both strategies. The quick, “cream-
skimming” visits will lead to much time spent traveling, and the departing 
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woodpecker may leave many good food items behind, whereas the “bowl-
licking” strategy will produce many prey per tree, but the woodpecker may 
waste time extracting the last dregs instead of moving to a fresh tree. This 
observation should lead the reader to think that foragers should be sensi-
tive to environmental richness. In a rich environment, the next tree may of-
fer a feast, so we would expect rich environments to favor cream skimming, 
whereas lean environments should favor thorough exploitation. 
Behavioral ecologists call this the problem of patch exploitation, and it 
plays a central role in our thinking about animal foraging decisions. More-
over, we have both a well-developed body of theory about this problem 
and extensive experimental and observational data (Stephens, Brown, & 
Ydenberg, 2007; Stephens & Krebs, 1986). Formal models of how animals 
exploit patches of food begin by considering the relationship between the 
time spent exploiting a patch and the amount of food the animal extracts. 
We call this relationship the gain function. Although the gain function can 
take many forms, the most plausible and common form is a negatively ac-
celerated shape, as Figure 1 shows. The amount of food in the patch sets 
an upper limit, so the gain function will asymptote to this maximum. The 
bending of the gain function captures an important property of natural re-
source exploitation: Resources deplete, and finding the next unit of food 
from a clump is typically harder and more time consuming than finding the 
previous unit of food. During a foraging bout, the animal spends its time 
doing two things: exploiting patches or traveling to new patches. If τ rep-
Figure 1. Hypothetical gain function. The gain function associated with extracting food 
from a patch is likely not linear. Instead, there are diminishing returns: As a patch depletes, 
it takes longer to find food. 
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resents the average time required to travel from one patch to the next, then 
the overall rate of food intake is 
g(t)
τ + t
where g(t) is the patch gain function, and t is the time spent exploiting each 
patch. (Notice that for simplicity, we assume a situation with only one type 
of patch; we can easily generalize this approach to more types.) Mathe-
matically, we can ask what value of t (the time spent exploiting patches, 
or patch-residence time) maximizes this intake rate, and we find that the 
best patch-residence time (t) is large when travel times between patches are 
large (i.e., in poor environments) and small when travel times are small (i.e., 
in rich environments; see Stephens & Krebs, 1986). 
This model makes the qualitative prediction that animals should skim 
the cream (spend a short time, extracting relatively little) when the travel 
time is short (rich environments) but that they should adopt a thorough ex-
ploitation strategy (spend more time, extracting more) when travel time is 
long. Do the data support this claim? Yes, they do; we have very strong ev-
idence from laboratory experiments, field experiments, and simple obser-
vations across many species and habitats that travel time affects patch-ex-
ploitation behavior, with increases in travel time leading to increases in 
patch-exploitation time (Stephens & Krebs, 1986). We develop a simple 
analysis of patch exploitation here to highlight an important naturally oc-
curring problem in intertemporal choice and its basic structure. Two key 
features of the patch-exploitation problem stand out. First, the patch-exploi-
tation problem is fundamentally sequential. Foragers make a sequence of 
patch visits such that the quality of the next patch influences the relative 
value of the present patch. Second, notice that although a forager exploit-
ing a patch must choose between staying and leaving, choosing to stay does 
not prevent the animal from eventually leaving. This contrasts sharply with 
many experimental studies of choice behavior in which the investigators 
set up a situation in which subjects must make mutually exclusive choices: 
Choosing Option A irrevocably slams the door on Option B. 
Impulsivity and Self-Control 
Traditional models of foraging, like the patch-exploitation model, are de-
rived from the premise of maximizing intake rate over a sequence of for-
aging choices, an assumption we call long-term rate maximization. Although 
one can raise many possible objections to this premise, it has served stu-
dents of foraging quite well overall, as the success in predicting the relation-
ship between travel time and patch-residence time shows. The long-term 
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rate approach has, however, repeatedly failed to predict choice in labora-
tory studies using the self-control (or delay-discounting) paradigm. In self-
control studies, the investigator trains subjects—typically pigeons (Co-
lumba livia) or rats (Rattus norvegicus)—to choose between a small reward 
the subject can obtain quickly (usually called smaller-sooner), and a larger 
reward it must wait a bit longer to obtain (larger-later; see Figure 2, Panel 
(a)). Using this scheme, the investigator can explore the effects of delay and 
amount on preference. The reader may notice that this procedure crudely 
resembles patch exploitation. The smaller-sooner option resembles a short 
patch stay yielding a smaller amount; conversely, the larger-later option is 
like staying longer and obtaining more. We might expect, therefore, some 
correspondence between observed choice in the two situations. Yet, results 
Figure 2. Self-control and patch experimental designs. (a) In the self-control condition, 
subjects begin with an intertrial interval θ before facing a simultaneous choice between a 
smaller-sooner reward (A1 = small amount, d1 = short delay) and a larger-later reward (A2 
= large amount, d2 = long delay). After experiencing the delay and consuming the reward, 
subjects begin another intertrial interval. (b) In the patch condition, subjects face a sequen-
tial choice between staying in the patch or leaving to find a new patch. Thus, all subjects 
wait for an intertrial interval τ, experience a short delay t1 and receive a small reward B1. 
Then, they choose between staying in the patch an additional delay t2 and receiving the 
additional reward B2 or leaving the patch to start another intertrial interval. Stephens and 
Anderson (2001) offered these conditions to blue jays and set the parameters such that 
choices in the self-control and patch treatments were economically equivalent. 
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from the two approaches diverge dramatically. Animals in self-control sit-
uations commonly prefer the smaller-sooner option even when the larger-
later option leads to a higher long-term rate of intake (Bateson & Kacelnik, 
1996; Mazur, 1987; McDiarmid & Rilling, 1965). In addition, the time be-
tween choice presentations (intertrial interval—the experimental analogue 
of travel time) has virtually no effect on choice in the self-control prepara-
tion (Mazur & Romano, 1992), even though patch studies have nearly uni-
versally shown that travel time affects patch exploitation. 
We describe this pattern of choice in self-control situations as impulsive. 
We define impulsivity as choosing a smaller-sooner option when a larger-
later option produces a better outcome. In broad strokes, this definition 
agrees with the day-to-day meaning that impulsive decisions lead to er-
ror. “I bought the iPhone impulsively” means that had I stopped to think 
through the long-term consequences, I would not have made this purchase. 
Of course, to identify impulsivity in nonhumans, we need to say what we 
mean by a “better outcome.” Motivated by foraging models and the tools 
they offer for calculating rate, here we operationally define impulsivity as 
choosing smaller-sooner alternatives when the larger-later option yields 
a higher long-term rate of intake. Clearly, observed behavior in the self-
control situation satisfies this definition. In these experiments, subjects of-
ten obtain less food than they could, creating an evolutionary puzzle. Why 
should natural selection favor choice mechanisms that produce less food? It 
would seem to be relatively simple to “engineer” a decision-making system 
that does better. Why has natural selection not done this? 
Evolutionary Approaches to Impulsivity 
As we have outlined here, the data suggest that animals consistently 
favor immediate rewards even though it seems that they could achieve 
higher fitness gains by choosing more delayed options. For behavioral ecol-
ogists, the natural first response to this puzzle is to speculate that immedi-
acy is valuable in some way that our traditional rate-based models fail to 
capture. Specifically, some have suggested that increasing delay reduces, or 
“discounts,” the value of delayed benefits. We remark that the phrase de-
lay discounting is closely linked to the study of impulsive choice, so much so 
that delay discounting and impulsivity are identical in the minds of some 
authors. From an evolutionary perspective, however, we see the puzzle of 
impulsivity as a description of the phenomenon of interest and delay dis-
counting as an explanatory hypothesis derived from economic principles. 
How can delay reduce value? There are two possibilities: costs due to 
collection risk and lost investment opportunity. According to the collection-
risk hypothesis, the animal has a better chance of collecting (or realizing) 
more immediate options. Behavioral ecologists often call this the “discount-
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ing-by-interruptions” hypothesis. In this hypothesis, we suppose that inter-
ruptions prevent an animal from collecting any delayed benefit. The model 
requires that interruptions occur in some time-dependent way, so that they 
occur more frequently in long intervals, thereby enhancing the relative 
value of short delays. In nature, these interruptions could come from group-
mates, from predators, from weather, or even from prey escaping, and we 
have clear evidence that interruptions occur. For example, groupmates of-
ten steal food from each other, so that a social forager who has located food 
surely experiences some risk of losing it, and presumably this risk increases 
with the time spent handling the food. Unfortunately, although we have 
many casual observations like this, we have virtually no rigorous informa-
tion about the critical statistical properties of these interruption processes. 
To account for observed levels of impulsivity, we would need fairly high 
interruption rates, likely much higher than exist in nature. 
For lost investment opportunities, consider a human investor who must 
choose between $100 now and $100 delayed for 1 year. Clearly, the $100 
now is more valuable because if the investor waits, she or he pays an op-
portunity cost by forgoing the benefits of investing the $100 for 1 year. We 
can imagine situations in which this may be relevant to nonhuman animals. 
For example, if the next unit of food allows a forager to improve its breed-
ing status or dominance, this could produce investment opportunity costs 
if benefits begin to accrue as soon as the animal gains its new status; so the 
sooner you obtain your new status, the better. Behavioral ecologists have 
not paid much attention to this possibility, perhaps because this sort of lost 
investment seems remote from the day-to-day world of animal behavior. 
Delay-Discounting Models of Impulsivity 
We can explore more rigorously the delay-discounting idea that delay 
reduces value by using mathematical models. Students of choice have fo-
cused on two delay-discounting models, the exponential and hyperbolic 
models, which we discuss in the following sections (see also Madden & 
Bickel, 2010, chs. 1 and 3). 
Exponential Model 
Imagine that the value of a delayed resource decays at a constant rate 
as delay increases. This could happen because interruptions occur at con-
stant rate or because investment opportunity costs accrue at a constant rate, 
or some combination of both. Restricting our attention to the interruptions 
idea simplifies our development. If interruptions occur at constant rate λ, 
then the expected value of a food reward of size A (for amount) delayed 
by d seconds is simply Vd = Ae–λd. If we knew or could estimate the inter-
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ruption rate, λ, then we could, in theory, predict the outcome of a self-con-
trol experiment by comparing ASe–λdS to ALe–λdL , where AS, dS, AL and dL 
represent the amounts and delays associated with the smaller-sooner and 
larger-later alternatives. This otherwise appealing model fails to predict the 
phenomenon of preference reversal, which is a key observation in the self-
control preparation (Ainslie, 1975; Ainslie & Hermstein, 1981; Green, Fisher, 
Perlow, & Sherman, 1981). Preference reversal occurs when a subject’s pref-
erence switches from smaller-sooner to larger-later as the delays associated 
with both options increase by the same amount. The exponential model 
cannot predict this because it predicts that adding a constant delay should 
modify the discounted value of both options by the same factor and there-
fore should not influence choice. Yet, animals are sensitive to this sort of 
general increase in delay; increasing both delays shifts preference toward 
the larger-later alternative. 
Hyperbolic Model 
At least partially in response to the failings of the exponential model, 
Mazur (1987) offered an algebraically simple delay-discounting model 
termed hyperbolic discounting (Ainslie, 1975), and Mazur’s elegant empirical 
work has lead to broad acceptance of this approach. According the hyper-
bolic model, the expression 
                                                  Vd =
     A
                                                           1 + kd
describes the decline of value with delay. The hyperbolic model can easily ac-
commodate preference reversal. To predict the outcome of a self-control test, 
we would compare AS/(1 + kdS) and AL/(1 + kdL). We call k the hyperbolic 
discount factor, and its meaning crudely parallels the meaning of λ in the ex-
ponential model: High k means that value declines more steeply with increas-
ing delay—more discounting. Notice, however, that we can, in principle, 
calculate the exponential model’s λ parameter a priori, for example, by ob-
serving or manipulating the interruption rate. In contrast, we must estimate 
the hyperbolic model’s k parameter from observed preference. That is, k is a 
fitted parameter. From the perspective of our attempts to explain how natural 
selection influences patterns of intertemporal choice, the hyperbolic model 
offers a description of observed choice rather than an explanation. 
Although these standard delay-discounting models play important roles 
in the fields of animal behavior and psychology, they inevitably leave those 
interested in the evolution of intertemporal choice unsatisfied. The expo-
nential model offers the promise of explanation from first principles but ul-
timately fails empirically. The hyperbolic model describes many data but 
has little explanatory power. In addition, the models suffer from a seldom-
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recognized disconnect with naturally occurring decision making in forag-
ing animals. Both focus on a single decision abstracted from the remainder 
of the animal’s activities (Kacelnik, 2003). Although one can see that this 
“single-shot” approach may be an informative theoretical device—like a 
physicist’s assumption of frictionless world—it is difficult to imagine ani-
mals facing single-shot decisions in the real world. Experiments with non-
humans require repeated trials for subjects to learn the payoffs and delays. 
Data from natural foraging (like patch exploitation) have suggested sensi-
tivity to future consequences; indeed, even within the laboratory paradigm 
of self-control testing, we have evidence of sensitivity to consequences be-
yond the current choice (Mazur, 1994). In other words, it is clear that animal 
choice typically occurs in a sequential context, so that any model purport-
ing to account for the economic consequences of choice needs to consider 
this basic reality. Yet, the empirical success of the single-shot hyperbolic 
model shows that we can often describe choice without references to this 
sequence. In our view, this is another perspective on the puzzle of impul-
sivity: Animals live in a world of sequential decision making, yet they often 
behave as if only the next choice matters to them. 
Short-Term Rate Model 
For some purposes, investigators prefer a simplified version of the hyper-
bolic model called the short-term rate model. Although not technically a dis-
counting model, it can predict impulsive choice. To apply this model to the 
self-control situation, we would compare AS/dS and AL/dL —that is, a rate 
comparison without the intertrial interval that we need to calculate the long-
term rate over a sequence of trials. In effect, this model hypothesizes that the 
subject considers the rate from the choice point to the food delivery but noth-
ing else. In practice, the hyperbolic and short-term rate models make similar 
predictions except when delays are very small, but the short-term rate model 
is convenient conceptually because we can compare it so easily to our stan-
dard of “economically sound” choice, the long-term rate model. Empirical 
studies that have tested a modified version of this model have shown that it 
can account for data in European starlings (Sturnus vulgaris) and cotton-top 
tamarins (Saguinus oedipus), even without the fitted k parameter of the hyper-
bolic model (Bateson & Kacelnik, 1996; Stevens, Hallinan, & Hauser, 2005). 
Discounted-Sequence Model 
Nothing about the concept of discounting necessitates single-shot de-
cision making. We can, for example, build delay-discounting models that 
consider sequences of gains. Stephens (2002) offered a simple discounted-
sequence model by considering a sequence of exponentially discounted 
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gains, which he called the exponentially discounted-sequence model. This log-
ically simple approach yields a hybrid of foraging theory’s long-term rate 
model and the single-shot exponential model. Like the single-shot exponen-
tial model, it includes an a priori discount rate parameter—so, for example, 
we know how variations in interruption rate should affect the value of a se-
quence. It can, in principle, accommodate preference reversal (as any rate-
based model can). Unfortunately, like most a priori models of discounted 
value, it fails to account for the self-control data quantitatively. For exam-
ple, we need very high discount rates to explain the strength of observed 
preferences for immediacy, yet at these high discount rates the model loses 
its ability to predict preference reversal. 
The failure of the exponentially discounted-sequence model illustrates 
the problems associated with finding a successful economic account of im-
pulsive choice behavior. We can capture rate-like properties such as pref-
erence reversal easily enough, but the strength of preferences for imme-
diacy suggests very high discount rates, and it is hard to imagine natural 
processes (interruption or opportunity cost) that could create such high dis-
count rates. In addition, the discounting-by-interruption hypothesis that be-
havioral ecologists have long favored seems increasingly strained. Experi-
ments on birds and humans (Henly et al., 2008; King & Logue, 1992) failed 
to find the predicted increase in preference for smaller-sooner options with 
experimentally created interruptions in a self-control situation. Suffice it to 
say, then, efforts to understand observed choice in terms of a priori mod-
els of discounted value leave something to be desired. Even though the eco-
nomic forces that reduce the value of delayed benefits (opportunity costs 
and collection risk) are surely real, they seem too weak to explain the strong 
preferences for immediacy we see in the self-control situation. 
Ecological Rationality of Impulsivity 
As explained earlier, animals exploiting patches change their behavior 
when travel time increases, spending more time in patches and extracting 
more food; in contrast, animals tested in the self-control preparation seem 
insensitive to changes in the experimental analogue of travel time, the in-
tertrial interval. Intrigued by this difference, Stephens and Anderson (2001) 
created an experimental comparison of the patch and self-control situations. 
To achieve this, Stephens and Anderson needed an experimentally tracta-
ble patch-choice situation that they could compare with self-control treat-
ments. Figure 2 shows their approach. In the self-control situations (Figure 
2, Panel A), the subject waits for a fixed intertrial interval θ and chooses be-
tween amount A1 after delay d1 and amount A2 after delay d2. In the patch 
situation (Figure 2, Panel B), the subject waits for a fixed intertrial interval—
travel time, τ (note that θ = τ, but we use different notation to distinguish 
between self-control and patch variables). When this time expires, the ap-
th e Ad A p ti v e nA tur e o f imp ul S i v i ty        371
paratus presents a single stimulus; in the jargon of foraging theory, this sin-
gle stimulus indicates a patch encounter. The subject “enters the patch”—
in Stephens and Anderson’s preparation, a blue jay (Cyanocitta cristata) 
hops forward to a perch just below the patch stimulus—and then the sub-
ject waits again: waiting time t1 for a food delivery of B1 (two pellets). Af-
ter this initial food delivery, the subject must make a choice: look for a new 
patch (i.e., start a fresh cycle of wait-encounter-wait-get food), or stay in the 
patch, waiting a bit longer (additional waiting time t2) for an additional two 
food pellets (amount B2). Although natural patches can, in principle, con-
tain many items, these experimental patches never produce more than two 
food deliveries, so the trial effectively ends after this second food delivery 
and the subject must start a new cycle of wait-encounter and so on. 
By choosing the amounts and delays carefully, Stephens and Anderson 
(200 1) created economically comparable patch and self-control situations, 
that is, situations in which the “leave and start over” choice produced the 
same amount of food (B1 = A1 = two pellets) and took the same time (τ + 
t1 = θ + d1 ) as the smaller-sooner option and the “stay” choice produced 
the same amount of food and took the same time as the larger-later option 
(B1 + B2 = A2 = four pellets; and τ + t1 + t2 = θ + d2 ). Even if this experimen-
tal patch situation is hopelessly simple minded as compared with the com-
plexity of naturally occurring patch exploitation, it frames the intertemporal 
choice problem in terms of leave versus stay rather than the more conven-
tional A-versus-B-style choice. 
Stephens and Anderson (2001) created a wide range of treatments sys-
tematically varying delays, amounts, and intertrial intervals but always en-
suring comparable patch and self-control versions of each condition. Figure 
3 shows conventional dose-response style plots that assess the subjects’ sen-
sitivity to long-term rate. As the figure shows, the jays followed an orderly 
sigmoid response in the patch situation, roughly following the predictions 
of long-term rate: choosing to stay when this gave the highest long-term 
rate and choosing to leave when the opposite was true. Moreover, with ex-
treme differences in rate, the jays strongly preferred the “correct” option. 
In contrast, the self-control data show a very weak response to long-term 
rate; although they tend to increase their preference for larger-later when 
this gives the higher long-term rate, they still take the smaller-sooner option 
quite frequently. Indeed, one can readily see the notorious impulsiveness of 
self-control treatments by observing that subjects chose the smaller-sooner 
option more frequently under almost all conditions. 
Why Be Impulsive? 
Animals perform poorly in the self-control situation, achieving lower 
rates of intake and acquiring less food than a hypothetical “more patient” 
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Figure 3. Influence of self-control and patch treatments on blue jay temporal preferences. 
The figure shows proportional choice of the option yielding the larger amount as a func-
tion of the difference in long-term rates associated with two options (Stephens & Ander-
son 2001). For example, zero means that large and small options produced the same long-
term rate; a negative value means that the smaller option produced the higher long-term 
rate; and a positive value means the larger option yielded the higher long-term rate. Blue 
jays experienced treatments that varied in the intertrial interval, the delay to the smaller op-
tion, and the delay to the larger option. Each treatment pair created the same difference in 
long-term rates in the self-control and patch situations. The data points represent the per-
formance of different individuals in each of the 12 treatments. The solid curves show the 
best least-square fit to a conventional dose-response relationship. As the data illustrate, 
the subject’s behavior seems to track the difference in long-term rate in the patch situa-
tion but not in self-control. From “The Adaptive Value of Preference for Immediacy: When 
Shortsighted Rules Have Farsighted Consequences,” by D. W. Stephens and D. Ander-
son, 2001, Behavioral Ecology, 12, p. 337. Copyright 2001 by Oxford University Press. 
Adapted with permission. 
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animal could. Yet, Stephens and Anderson’s (2001) blue jays did quite well 
in the economically analogous patch situation. What explains this? There 
are two possibilities. Subjects could use different decision rules in the two 
situations; alternatively, the same mechanisms (e.g., decision rules such as 
“choose the option with the highest short-term rate”) may simply work bet-
ter in the patch situation. 
Short-Term Rule, Long-Term Benefits 
Stephens and Anderson (2001) argued for the second possibility. To see 
their argument, consider the long-term rates associated with the two op-
tions in patch choice. If the subject repeatedly leaves, it obtains a long-term 
rate of 
B1
τ + t1
If the subject repeatedly stays, however, it obtains a long-term rate of 
B1 + B2
τ + t1 + t2
Obviously, staying is better than leaving in the long run if 
B1 + B2      >      
B1
 τ + t1 + t2       τ + t1
This is a classical comparison in foraging theory that asks the follow-
ing question: Will the forager benefit from adding an activity that yields 
amount B2 in time t2 to the things it is already doing (which, on average, 
yields amount B1 every τ + t1 time units)? We can easily show that the an-
swer is yes if and only if 
B2   >   B1
t2   τ + t1
Although it may not be immediately obvious, this comparison is precisely 
the impulsive short-term rate rule we discussed earlier. In the patch situa-
tion, then, a subject who makes a short-term comparison (leaving, yielding 
B1 in τ + t1 seconds, vs. staying, yielding B2 in t2 seconds) will coincidentally 
also be choosing the option that produces highest long-term rate. Yet, a sub-
ject who made the same short-term comparison in the self-control situation 
would compare B1 in t1 seconds and B2 in t2 seconds. By ignoring τ, subjects 
may be more likely to choose the smaller-sooner reward even though the 
larger-later reward offers a better long-term rate. 
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In light of this argument, the ecological rationality hypothesis holds that 
natural selection has favored short-sighted rules of choice because these 
rules fare well (achieve high long-term intake rates) in naturally occurring 
choice situations that have a structure similar to patch exploitation. How-
ever, these same rules fare poorly in tests of simultaneous, mutually exclu-
sive choice, which are likely rare in nature. Notice that according to this 
hypothesis, selection could favor choice mechanisms that produce impul-
sive choice without discounting, even though the ecological rationality ap-
proach is not necessarily incompatible with discounting. 
This application of the short-term rule to the patch situation hypothesizes 
that the subject views the intertrial interval (τ ) and the first time to food (t1) 
as a single combined delay. This is rather a bold claim given that self-control 
results suggest a strong asymmetry (delay has a powerful effect on choice, 
but the intertrial interval has little effect). To test this claim, Stephens and Mc-
Linn (2003) provided blue jays with a range of conditions using the same to-
tal delay (i.e., τ + t1 = constant) but different mixes of intertrial interval (τ) and 
initial delay (t1). They showed that increasing the total delay (τ + t1) shifted 
preference toward staying as predicted in the patch situation, but the jays did 
not respond to the different mixes of intertrial intervals and initial delay. 
Foreground/Background 
Our description of the ecological rationality hypothesis describes the 
choice structure that favors impulsiveness rather vaguely as “similar to patch 
exploitation.” What does that mean? Stephens, Kerr, and Fernandez-Juricic 
(2004) have developed a more explicit description of situations that favor im-
pulsive decision making that they call foreground/background structure. As a 
forager moves through its habitat, it encounters many types of resources and 
presumably makes many choices about how to exploit them. At any moment, 
we suppose that the forager follows what we call a background strategy that 
represents its default or standard behavior. Obviously, the background strat-
egy yields a stream of gains, and we could characterize the benefits associ-
ated with this background strategy using any model we favor (e.g., long-term 
rate). Occasionally, the forager encounters a new resource that represents an 
opportunity to deviate from the background strategy (Figure 4). We refer to 
this as a “foreground” option, and the forager must now choose between con-
tinuing with the background strategy or deviating to exploit the foreground 
option and then returning to the background strategy. Notice that the crit-
ical feature of this form is that the background strategy is part of both op-
tions, and this fact greatly reduces the costs of short-sighted decision mak-
ing. Many naturally occurring choices follow this pattern, including but by 
no means limited to patch exploitation. We can view diet choice, mate choice, 
and many other resource exploitation decisions in this way. 
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Discrimination Advantage 
As we explained earlier, in the patch situation an animal using the short-
term rule can achieve the same long-term intake rate as an animal that di-
rectly compares long-term rates. Some recent analyses have suggested 
an even stronger result (Stephens, 2002; Stephens et al., 2004). If judg-
ments about differences in time follow Weber’s law (Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon, 
Church, Fairhurst, & Kacelnik, 1988), then a short-term comparison can, in 
principle, be superior to a long-term comparison in the self-control situa-
tion. An animal that compares long-term differences will necessarily com-
pare larger quantities because the intertrial interval is included, whereas an 
animal comparing short-term differences will compare smaller quantities. 
Because perceptual mechanisms usually generate more error when they 
compare larger quantities (e.g., 3 seconds vs. 5 seconds is easier to discrimi-
nate than 11 seconds vs. 13 seconds; Figure 5), an animal making long-term 
comparisons would discriminate between the two delays less accurately, re-
sulting in occasional choices for a lower intake rate. This leads to the par-
adoxical conclusion that an animal making short-term comparisons could, 
in principle, achieve a higher long-term intake rate than an animal making 
long-term comparisons. 
Although one can use discounting functions to describe animal impul-
sivity in the self-control paradigm, finding explanatory discounting models 
has proved quite challenging. Current evidence has suggested, for exam-
ple, that interruptions do not create a bias favoring immediacy as delay-dis-
counting models have long hypothesized (Henly et al., 2008; King & Logue, 
1992). In addition, although we find explanatory models that predict the 
qualitative properties (e.g., preference reversal) correctly, the same models 
fail to capture the quantitative properties of observed choice. In the face of 
Figure 4. Foreground-background comparison. Animals often face choices between a 
“default” series of options (background) and the occasional chance to temporarily devi-
ate from the default (foreground). In this example, a hypothetical forager has consumed 
three background options (filled circles) and must now choose between continuing with 
the background options (open circles) or opting for the foreground option (open square). It 
is important to note that choosing the foreground option forgoes the opportunity for some 
background options but eventually results in returning to the background strategy. 
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these challenges, the ecological rationality hypothesis offers an exciting and 
important alternative that can explain impulsive choice without discount-
ing, although we could incorporate discounting into ecological rationality 
models if this proves to be important. We are just beginning to explore the 
ecological rationality idea; further experimentation and theorizing will un-
doubtedly refine this approach. 
Adaptive Hypotheses for Intertemporal Choice 
Up to now, our discussion has focused on the evolutionary puzzle of im-
pulsivity, and we have argued that ecological rationality offers a new and 
compelling explanation of impulsivity in self-control experiments. In this fi-
nal section, we take a larger view in two senses. First, we focus on the more 
general problem of intertemporal choice rather than the narrower topic of im-
pulsivity. That is, we consider a broader view of intertemporal choice that 
Figure 5. Discrimination advantage of short-term rates. Scalar expectancy theory states 
that the variance around estimates of temporal duration increases with the magnitude of 
the duration (Gibbon, 1977). Shorter durations, therefore, are easier to discriminate than 
longer durations. For instance, there may be little variance for estimations of 3- and 5-sec-
ond durations, so discriminating between them is easy. When adding a constant time (e.g., 
the intertrial interval) of 8 seconds to these durations, however, the variance dramatically 
increases for 11 and 13 seconds, and estimates greatly overlap for these durations, mak-
ing them difficult to distinguish. 
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includes the vast range of situations in which animals must choose between 
options that vary in both time and magnitude. Second, we consider how in-
tertemporal choice problems arise in nature, and how natural selection, act-
ing in real-world ecological situations, may have shaped animal mechanisms 
of intertemporal choice. Drawing from the models of impulsivity reviewed 
earlier, we recognize three explanatory principles. First, we can probably ex-
plain many aspects of naturally occurring intertemporal choice using sim-
ple rate models, as traditional models of foraging behavior advocate. Second, 
the economic forces associated with delay discounting (collection risk and 
the opportunity costs of investments) may be important for many species. Fi-
nally, approaches based on the premise of ecological rationality emphasize 
the mismatch between rules that work well in natural situations and the rules 
required to make economically perfect decisions. We recognize these as dis-
tinct approaches mostly because they have been handed down to us via dif-
ferent research traditions, yet the boundaries between them are often fuzzy. 
Nevertheless, we find it helpful to use these three approaches to organize this 
final section on the adaptive nature of intertemporal choice. 
Rate Effects on Intertemporal Choice 
Theoretical behavioral ecology offers an extensive menu of rate-based 
models, covering many different domains. We have rate models that deal 
with patch exploitation, diet choice, habitat choice, joining social groups, 
and so on (reviewed in Giraldeau & Caraco, 2000; Stephens et al., 2007; Ste-
phens & Krebs, 1986). Yet, students of intertemporal choice often pass by 
rate-based explanations in the search for more elaborate approaches. In-
deed, our discussion of impulsivity earlier in the chapter explicitly defined 
rate out of the problem. Although there certainly are situations in which we 
need to look beyond rate models to explain intertemporal choice, we should 
not throw the baby out with the bath water. Rate models describe the basic 
economics of repeated choice in a simple and powerful way. At worst, rate 
models provide baseline expectations (as in the study of impulsivity) and at 
best they make well-supported predictions (as in patch exploitation). 
So what can rate models tell us about intertemporal choice in nature? 
Consider again the basic patch-exploitation problem described earlier. At 
one extreme, we can imagine an “impatient” cream-skimming tactic that 
grabs the good stuff in a patch and quickly moves on, and at the other ex-
treme we might have a “patient” bowl-licking strategy extracting even the 
last dregs before moving to the next patch. Rate-based models tell us that 
an animal’s options elsewhere should set the balance between these two 
approaches. In a rich environment, the animal has many good alternatives 
beyond the current patch, so we predict something like cream skimming; 
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however, in a poor environment the current patch looks pretty good com-
pared with the animal’s options elsewhere, and we predict a strategy ap-
proximating bowl licking. Crudely speaking then, we expect that species 
adapted to rich environments should be less patient. Experimental data on 
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and bonobos (Pan paniscus) in captivity sup-
port this prediction (Rosati, Stevens, Hare, & Hauser, 2007). In the wild, 
bonobos live in a richer environment, feeding more heavily on abundant 
herbaceous vegetation. Chimpanzees, in contrast, forage on fruit more than 
herbaceous vegetation, which is less abundant in their habitats (Malenky 
& Wrangham, 1994). When tested in repeated self-control tasks, bonobos 
seemed less patient, opting for the cream-skimming technique. 
Our hypothetical cream skimmer leaves food patches early because stay-
ing longer would reduce its chance to acquire food at a higher rate else-
where. This, of course, follows from the assumption that an animal spend-
ing time in the current patch cannot simultaneously spend its time looking 
for new patches. This is the bedrock assumption of rate-based models. They 
owe their successes (and their limitations) to the simple way in which they 
caricature this basic trade-off. Yet, this is not always true. Some animals can 
search for new resources while they exploit others. A web-building spider 
can, for example, multitask in this way because it can extract nutrients from 
one prey item while its web works to capture a second. Some species, then, 
experience a sort of release from the conventional exploit versus search 
trade-off. Animals that experience no exploit-search trade-off should not re-
ally care about exploitation delays-after all, it costs them nothing. 
Discounting Effects on Intertemporal Choice 
Delay discounting refers to a reduction in a reward’s value caused by de-
lay. We are cautious with applying discounting as an explanation of choice 
in the self-control situation for two reasons. First, we now have several hy-
potheses that can, in principle, account for specific laboratory results with-
out discounting (Bateson & Kacelnik, 1996; Kacelnik, 2003; Stephens & An-
derson, 2001). Second, direct manipulation of delay-discounting variables 
did not have the predicted effect on choice (Henly et al., 2008; King & Logue, 
1992). Despite these setbacks in the laboratory, we have good reasons to be-
lieve that delay-discounting effects—both collection risk and opportunity 
costs—have shaped animal temporal preferences in some important situa-
tions. The laboratory tasks may not capture the ecologically relevant risks 
and opportunity costs that animals face in their natural environments. 
Collection Risk 
As we explained previously, animals may discount delayed rewards be-
cause the future is uncertain; some event—a so-called interruption—may 
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prevent the animal from collecting a delayed reward. The discounting-by-
interruptions hypothesis seems compelling to many students of animal 
behavior because natural interruptions can come in many forms, such as 
social interruptions, interruptions by predators, and so on. Indeed, some 
evidence has suggested that interruptions and cues predicting interrup-
tions can influence intertemporal choice. This section reviews naturally oc-
curring interruptions and the evidence that these interruptions affect inter-
temporal choice. 
Life Expectancy 
Death ultimately interrupts us all, humans and nonhumans alike. An 
evolutionary approach predicts differences in intertemporal choice for spe-
cies that vary in life span. Mathematically, we can substitute the mortality 
rate (a classic parameter from demography) into the exponential discount-
ing model to motivate a life-expectancy-based model of delay discount-
ing. Clearly, adult insects with very short life spans would not do well 
to delay payoffs for long periods, when they are unlikely to survive long 
enough to reap the rewards. We intuitively expect, therefore, that inter-
temporal choice should scale with expected life span. To explore this, we 
can evaluate the comparative data shown in Figure 6. Here, we see that 
Old World monkeys and apes wait much longer than birds, rodents, and 
other primates. Although at first glance, life span appears to correlate with 
these comparative data, on closer inspection this is not the case. On the 
one hand, pigeons, cotton-top tamarins, common marmosets (Callithrix jac-
chus), and capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) live much longer than rats but 
share similar temporal preferences. On the other hand, chimpanzees and 
bonobos have similar life spans but quite different temporal preferences. 
Life span and mortality-rate effects probably only influence intertemporal 
choice at the extremes—for example, explaining differences between very 
short-lived and very long-lived species. 
Although the effect of life span on intertemporal choice may be swamped 
by other ecological factors at the species level, life expectancy may have 
a strong effect at the individual level. An adaptive approach predicts that 
temporal preferences should change over the life span of organisms (Daly 
& Wilson, 2005; Sozou & Seymour, 2003). In fact, as organisms age or per-
ceive cues associated with a short life expectancy, they often prefer immedi-
ate payoffs rather than waiting for delayed payoffs. For instance, when par-
asitoid wasps (Leptopilina heterotoma) detect cues associated with a short life 
expectancy, they lay more eggs in lower quality hosts than in the absence of 
the cues (Roitberg et al., 1992). The wasps accept a lower reproductive out-
put when the future appears uncertain. Thus, individuals can flexibly re-
spond to a shortened temporal horizon, a finding also reported in older hu-
man adults (Carstensen, 2006). 
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Competition 
For most species, competition with groupmates or other species poses 
an enormous interruption risk. Waiting to obtain a food item or mating op-
portunity gives others the chance to grab it in the meantime. For instance, 
bypassing a smaller, closer food item in favor of a larger, more distant one 
means that a social forager may well end up with nothing because group-
mates have arrived first. We would expect, therefore, that species living in 
larger, competitive groups should exhibit stronger preferences for immedi-
acy than solitary species. At the moment, we have not tested enough spe-
cies to evaluate this comparative hypothesis. 
At the individual level, however, we have clear evidence of competitive 
interference effects on intertemporal choice. In parallel with the wasp ex-
ample mentioned previously, some species are quite sensitive to cues asso-
ciated with social interruptions, especially caching species. Caching (or stor-
ing) food offers one of the most striking instances of delayed rewards for 
Figure 6. Comparison of animal species tested in self-control paradigm. Researchers 
have tested pigeons, rats, tamarins, marmosets, capuchin monkeys, macaques, bonobos, 
and chimpanzees in the self-control paradigm. In this comparison, individuals chose be-
tween two immediate rewards and six delayed rewards. In most cases, the bars represent 
the mean delay to receiving the large reward at which subjects were indifferent between 
the smaller-sooner and larger-later reward. Error bars represent the range of minimum and 
maximum indifference points for subjects. The capuchin data represent an interpolation 
of approximate indifference points with twofold and fourfold differences in food amounts. 
Data sources: pigeons and rats, Green, Myerson, Holt, Slevin, and Estle (2004); tamarins 
and marmosets, Stevens et al. (2005); capuchins, Ramseyer, Pele, Dufour, Chauvin, and 
Thierry (2006); macaques, Tobin, Logue, Chelonis, and Ackerman (1996); and bonobos 
and chimpanzees, Rosati et al. (2007). 
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nonhuman animals because caching animals actively choose to delay con-
sumption, often for months. This long-term storage makes cached food 
vulnerable to pilferage from competitors (Vander Wall, 1990). Both natu-
ral observations and laboratory experiments have shown that individuals 
adaptively respond to this social risk by eating rather than caching when in 
the presence of potential pilferers (Carrascal & Moreno, 1993; Emery, Dally, 
& Clayton, 2004). The threat of competitive interruption triggers a prefer-
ence for immediate payoffs. 
Opportunity Costs 
In addition to increasing collection risk, waiting imposes opportunity 
costs because an animal must wait to put delayed rewards to use. In one 
of the first attempts to address species differences in intertemporal prefer-
ence, Tobin and Logue (1994) argued that species with high metabolic rates 
simply cannot afford to wait long delays to receive food and will prefer im-
mediate rewards more than will species with lower metabolic rates. Thus, 
for animals with high metabolic rates, waiting imposes high investment op-
portunity costs because they can put smaller-sooner rewards to use sooner 
to meet their high metabolic demands. Tobin and Logue used an analysis 
of previous experiments on pigeons, rats, and humans to support this hy-
pothesis. Given their much smaller body size, pigeons and rats have higher 
specific metabolic rates than humans, and metabolic rates correlated with 
impulsive choice in self-control procedures. Although consistent with the 
differential metabolic rate hypothesis, these data do not demonstrate a de-
finitive link between metabolic rate and intertemporal choice because these 
three species vary in many ways other than their metabolic rates. Neverthe-
less, metabolic costs—and investment opportunity costs more generally—
may play a key role in determining temporal preferences, and an analysis 
with a wider range of species would certainly be illuminating. 
Ecological Rationality of Intertemporal Choice 
Todd and Gigerenzer (2000) defined ecological rationality as “adaptive 
behavior resulting from the fit between the mind’s mechanisms and the 
structure of the environment in which it operates” (p. 728). That is, the ap-
propriateness of a decision mechanism depends on the decision environ-
ment. In laboratory settings, ecological rationality may result in a mismatch 
between the domain of selection and the domain of testing. The Stephens 
and Anderson (2001) result clearly exemplifies this. According this hypoth-
esis, natural selection has favored mechanisms that perform well in solving 
patch-exploitation problems (the domain of selection), yet these same mech-
anisms lead to errors in conventional laboratory tests of choice (the domain 
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of testing). The key point analytically is that identifying and understanding 
the domain of selection is critical to understanding the behavior revealed in 
a range of testing domains. 
Clearly, this mismatch problem applies quite broadly, given that test-
ing situations almost never match the domain of selection. For example, Ste-
vens et al. (2005) tested temporal preferences in two closely related species of 
monkeys, cotton-top tamarins and common marmosets. Although similar in 
many ways, these two species differ in one crucial aspect: their diets. Tam-
arins eat primarily insects-which require quick action to capture—whereas 
marmosets feed primarily on sap and gum exuding from trees (Snowdon & 
Soini, 1988; Stevenson & Rylands, 1988). Marmosets chew on tree bark and 
wait for seconds, minutes, or hours for the sap to flow. Thus, the marmosets 
are adapted to waiting for food. In a self-control paradigm, marmosets waited 
almost twice as long as tamarins for the same amount of food (Stevens et al., 
2005). Recall that the tamarins were one of the species whose preferences 
matched the predictions of the short-term rate model. Marmosets, there-
fore, exhibited more patience than this model predicts. The bonobo-chimpan-
zee difference we discussed previously also shows this pattern. The bonobo 
preferences matched predictions of the rate model (this time, the long-term 
rate model), whereas the chimpanzees were more patient than expected (Ro-
sati et al., 2007). In both of these cases, the species that deals with longer de-
lays in the natural foraging environment also waits longer than expected by 
a rate model. These may offer cases of the decision mechanisms being tuned 
to the delayed nature of their natural foraging environment. Under the artifi-
cial conditions of the self-control paradigm, the marmosets and chimpanzees 
seem overly patient when using ecologically rational decision mechanisms. 
Uniquely Human Patience? 
A glance at Figure 6 shows something striking. The animals tested so far 
in the self-control situation do not wait more than a few seconds or minutes 
for a threefold increase in food amount. Although we offer good explana-
tions for why this is the case, these preferences, nevertheless, pale in com-
parison to the temporal preferences documented in humans. Economists 
and psychologists have repeatedly shown that humans are willing to wait 
months or years for delayed payoffs (reviewed in Frederick, Loewenstein, 
& O’Donoghue, 2002), leading some to propose patience as a unique capac-
ity in humans (e.g., McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004). 
Readers should evaluate these claims cautiously, however, because the 
methodologies used in human and nonhuman testing often differ dramati-
cally. These different decision-making environments could tap different de-
cision mechanisms, resulting in divergent but ecologically rational prefer-
ences. As we have already mentioned, in self-control experiments animals 
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always experience repeated choices between food rewards with no other 
way to acquire food and few, if any, alternative activities available (for an 
alternative paradigm, see Beran, Savage-Rumbaugh, Pate, & Rumbaugh, 
1999; Evans & Beran, 2007). In contrast, investigators usually ask humans 
about their temporal preferences for money (but for primary rewards such 
as food and juice, see Lagorio & Madden, 2005; McClure, Ericson, Laib-
son, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2007). Often, both the monetary rewards and 
the delay periods are hypothetical, but even if real money is offered, par-
ticipants can obviously leave the experiment and go about their daily lives 
while waiting for the payoffs. Thus, important differences exist in the re-
ward types, number of exposures to options, sampling methods required 
(descriptions vs. experiences with options), and costs associated with wait-
ing between human and nonhuman experiments. 
Rosati et al. (2007) explored whether humans do indeed exhibit more pa-
tience than other animals by testing humans and chimpanzees in a com-
parable self-control experiment. Both species experienced repeated choices 
between a smaller food reward available immediately and a larger food re-
ward available after 2 minutes. Humans rarely waited for the large rewards 
(even less than the chimpanzees did), demonstrating that (a) humans are 
not always patient and (b) comparing the existing human and animal data 
is not a valid comparison. When tested with similar rewards using similar 
procedures, humans look much more like other animals, showing a strong 
preference for immediate rewards. Thus, the intertemporal choice decision 
mechanisms are tuned to specific decision environments, supporting the 
ecological rationality hypothesis. 
Summary 
The puzzle of impulsivity has been documented repeatedly in self-con-
trol experiments in pigeons, blue jays, and starlings. In each of these spe-
cies, individuals prefer a smaller-sooner reward more often than expected 
by a long-term rate model. Much like the paradox of altruism, we believe 
that impulsivity is in the eye of the beholder—there are a number of reason-
able explanations for it. The long-term rate-based approach of classic forag-
ing theory fails to account for the data in this situation, although short-term 
models do quite well. The alternative, delay-discounting approach nicely 
captures quantitative aspects of the data, but offers no explanation of ob-
served preferences, only a description. When viewed through the lens of 
an evolutionary approach, a preference for immediate rewards appears not 
impulsive but adaptive in a naturally occurring behavioral situation. A de-
cision mechanism adapted to a common foraging problem may not work 
as well in an artificial situation contrived in the laboratory. This is a specific 
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example of the more general phenomenon of ecological rationality—the 
adaptive match between decision mechanisms and the decision environ-
ment. We argue that this ecological rationality approach can be very infor-
mative to the study of impulsivity and to the study of intertemporal choice 
more broadly. In fact, the ecological rationality approach is broad enough 
to include both the rate and the delay-discounting approaches. It offers pre-
dictive models of intertemporal choice and emphasizes the general nature 
of trading off time delays and reward amounts, an important and ubiqui-
tous class of decisions that all organisms face. 
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